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Abstract
Financial conflicts of interest exist between industry and physicians, and these relationships have the power to 
influence physicians’ medical practice. Transparency about conflicts matters for ensuring adequate informed 
consent, controlling healthcare expenditure, and encouraging physicians’ reflection on professionalism. The 
US Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) launched the Open Payments Program (OPP) to publicly 
disclose and bring transparency to the relationships between industry and physicians in the United States. We 
set out to explore user awareness of the database and the ease of accessibility to disclosed information, however, 
as we show, both awareness and actual use are very low. Two practical policies can greatly enhance its intended 
function and help alleviate ethical tension. The first is to provide data for individual physicians not merely in 
absolute terms, but in meaningful context, that is, in relation to the zip code, city, and state averages. The second 
increases access to the OPP dataset by adding hyperlinks from physicians’ professional websites directly to their 
Open Payments disclosure pages. These changes considerably improve transparency and the utility of available 
data, and can furthermore enhance professionalism and accountability by encouraging physicians to reflect 
more actively on their own practices.
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Background 
The importance of disclosing conflicts of interest has 
been recognized by key international health organizations 
including the World Medical Association,1,2 the World 
Health Organization (WHO),3 the Council for International 
Organizations of Medical Sciences,4 and the Nuffield Council 
on Bioethics.5 Despite international agreement on the need 
for transparency from leading policy organizations, conflicts 
of interests (COIs) are still problematic world-wide.6-11
To help document interactions between physicians and 
industry, the United States,12 Japan,13 Australia,14 France,15 and 
more than 30 European countries represented by the European 
Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations 
(EFPIA)16 implemented public databases detailing financial 
interactions between physicians and industry. While this 
trend of public disclosure is gaining precedence within 
wealthier countries, similar public databases could become 
useful in low- and middle-income countries in an effort to 
strive toward a higher standard of good governance.
Our investigation here assesses the physician-industry COI 
disclosure database in the United States, known as the Open 
Payments Program (OPP), by focusing on user awareness of 
the database and the ease of accessibility to information that 
impacts health care.
US Context
In light of a growing concern for COIs in the United States, 
and in response to the need for more empirical evidence 
documenting their existence, the US Institutes of Medicine 
(IOM) released a comprehensive report in 2009 titled Conflict 
of Interest in Medical Research, Education, and Practice, 
which found among other things that a physician who has 
a financial relationship with a third party company, may be 
influenced to prescribe that company’s medicine even when 
other therapies are indicated to be more beneficial.17
Following the release of IOM report there was a push to 
pass the Physician Payment Sunshine Act,18 which was 
eventually included as Section 6002 in the Affordable Care 
Act (ACA).19 The Department of Health and Human Services 
then tasked the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services 
(CMS) to establish a federal database on industry payments to 
physicians caring for Medicaid, Medicare, and the Children’s 
Health Insurance Program (CHIP) patients.20 This online 
database, implemented in 2014, came to be known as the 
OPP,12 and it allows users to look up physicians’ names to see 
the financial relationships those doctors have with industry.
For 2015, the OPP shows that $1.99 billion in general 
payments and $85.58 million in research payments were 
made to as many as 618 000 physicians.21 The largest single 
general payment amounted to $30.0 million, the smallest to 
$0.01. Patients can search the OPP for individual physicians 
and view their total annual payments, as well as 16 payment 
subcategories, including consulting and speaking fees, 
honoraria, gifts, entertainment, food and beverage, travel and 
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lodging, research payments, and company ownership stakes.22
COI Transparency: The Ethical Imperative
COIs are classically conceptualized as “a set of circumstances 
or conditions in which professional judgment of a primary 
interest, such as the integrity and quality of research, tends to 
be unduly influenced by a secondary interest...”23 The primary 
interest of physicians is to promote the health of their patients. 
Secondary interests are additional goals that could be related 
to the profession, but may also be completely distinct. They 
include increasing one’s income, earning grant funding, 
or being promoted. A conflict of interest is a tendency for 
secondary interests to be prioritized over primary interests.
Not all industry payments to physicians lead to COIs that 
negatively affect patients in prescribing or other practices. In 
principle, industry payments may also have positive effects. 
For example, certain types of payment from industry can 
be a marker of physician skill that may translate into better 
patient care. However, the academic literature as well as court 
proceedings, clearly demonstrate an undesirable frequency 
of cases in which physicians’ personal interests override 
evidence-based diagnostic or therapeutic choices.17,24,25 
Social scientists have shown that personal benefits can 
unduly influence decision-making,26 and financial COI 
have been demonstrated to affect the prescribing patterns of 
physicians.27-30
In the worst case of COIs, patients experience harm from 
medically unnecessary drugs or interventions,17 but COIs 
can also harm patients when medical need is uncontroversial. 
For example, physicians may choose among different 
interventions those that benefit themselves the most, even 
when other interventions are more effective, or differ in 
side-effects in ways that matter to patients.29-31 Furthermore, 
patients may be harmed financially. Out-of-pocket cost can 
vary considerably between interventions, and physicians’ 
choices may needlessly burden patients with a higher share of 
the cost, for example, where costly branded drugs that confer 
a financial benefit to the physician are prescribed instead of 
generics.31
For these reasons, chiefly, patients need to know if physicians 
might be guided by interests other than providing evidence-
based care. Consent in clinical practice—a foundational 
cornerstone of medical ethics—is meaningless where COIs 
substantially affect the type and amount of information or 
interventions that patients receive. If there is a shortcoming 
in the full disclosure of information, the consent given cannot 
justifiably be considered informed.32 Physicians themselves 
may not always disclose industry payments to patients in 
consultations, which underlines the ethical importance of the 
OPP that expressly aims to “permit patients to make better 
informed decisions when choosing health care professionals.”20 
In a secondary, yet also important ethical perspective, the 
OPP further seeks to mitigate negative budgetary impacts. 
It is hoped that the published data will “deter inappropriate 
financial relationships which can sometimes lead to increased 
healthcare costs.”20
The Ethical Policy Response to COI
Despite the findings of the IOM report and other robust 
data,17,24,25,33 some doubt the seriousness of COI in medicine. 
A recent controversy revealed profound disagreement among 
leading commentators about whether COI data should be 
disclosed.34-37 But COI policy must not only satisfy experts. 
First and foremost, it must work for those at risk of dramatic 
consequences from COIs—patients.
Patients’ perceptions of COI disclosure impact the physician-
patient relationship. In general, patients who believe that 
their physician is receiving gifts or payments from industry, 
for example, have lower trust in their physicians.38,39 The type 
of payment, however, also matters to patients. Some payment 
categories, such as consulting, are seen as more acceptable, 
while others, such as payment for travel and accommodations 
at a resort, are met with lower approval.39
Even if physicians have financial COI with industry, when 
they disclosed those relationships, patients either trusted them 
more,40 or the level of trust remained the same.41 If disclosure 
is more accessible, it can prompt open conversations about 
COI between physicians and patients and potentially lead to 
more trusting relationships and better health outcomes.
COI disclosure has further significance for patient decision-
making. A 2012 study shows that patients are less likely to 
take a prescribed drug if a physician had recently received 
a gift from the manufacturer in exchange for listening to a 
pharmaceutical representative speak about that drug.42 The 
authors also found that when patients mistrust their provider, 
they are less likely to adhere to a prescribed treatment or other 
recommendations, which could have serious adverse health 
effects.42 Knowing about their physician’s relationship with 
industry, therefore, has real implications to patients who may 
change their treatment decisions or involvement in a clinical 
trial based on COI information.43
In principle, the importance of COI disclosure to patient 
decision-making and physicians’ reflection on their own 
professional practice has been recognized with the OPP 
database, which can provide patients and physicians with 
important information and support ethically meaningful 
consent. Yet, it is not clear that the database is realizing its full 
potential. 
To assess the scope of improvement, we administered a survey 
asking US residents if knowing about COI was important to 
them and whether they were aware of, and had ever accessed, 
the OPP database. We also ran searches on the OPP database 
and the portal of a major health plan as a hypothetical patient 
interested in ascertaining physicians’ COIs, to determine 
whether COI data were easy to find and understand.
Methods
Survey of US Residents’ Attitudes towards COI
We surveyed US residents about the importance of financial 
COI between healthcare manufacturing companies and 
physicians. To gain access to a representative sample of 
Americans, we used GfK Custom Research North America’s 
KnowledgePanel™. The panel is a probability-based online 
non-volunteer access panel that combines address-based 
and random digit dial sampling. It comprises 55 000 adult 
members and is estimated to cover approximately 97% of 
US households. Recruited non-internet households receive 
a laptop computer and free internet service. For each 
survey, active panel members are drawn using a probability 
proportional to size (PPS) weighted sampling approach. The 
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Panel’s methodology is otherwise described in detail on the 
company’s website.44,45 GfK’s policies outlining participant 
voluntariness and informed consent can also be found 
online.46 
Our instrument comprised two brief multiple choice questions 
that were pilot tested with 10 participants. In fielding the 
survey, the questions were combined with others about heat 
waves, genetic testing, and future Olympic Games (there were 
no other healthcare related questions that could have led to 
framing effects). To further reduce framing effects, we also 
alternated the sequence of answers. The findings contained 
in this report are based on a survey fielded from June 19–
21, 2015. As per GFK policy, the outgoing sample was PPS 
weighted, and the incoming sample had further (proprietary) 
demographic weights applied to ensure representativeness. 
The outgoing sample comprised 3125 individuals, and the 
incoming sample of 1005, was made up of 510 male and 
495 female adults, all 18 years of age and over. This gave a 
completion rate of 34.7%, although the rate cannot be seen 
as indicating a particular willingness or lack thereof in terms 
of responding to questions about COIs, as questions were 
bundled with the above noted, unrelated ones.
Statistical Analysis
We analysed the distribution for each variable after GfK’s 
weighting using SAS 9.4 statistical analysis software. In 
our analysis, we included variables for gender, age, income, 
region, race, education, marital status, employment status, 
own or rent home, housing type, and households with internet 
access. We then dichotomized responses into two categories, 
unimportant (containing “completely unimportant” and 
“not very important”) and important (containing “somewhat 
important” and “very important”). Participants who refused 
to answer were treated as missing. Since there was no obvious 
hypothesis that a particular variable would be central, we 
looked at the association between each of the demographic 
variables with the dichotomized variable, adding all the 
variables to a logistic regression model, assuming an alpha 
level of 5% when determining statistical significance.
Search Strategy for Health Plan Data
We adopted the perspective of a hypothetical patient looking 
for a cardiovascular disease specialist in the randomly 
determined zip code of 44106, with Blue Cross Blue Shield’s 
Medicare Advantage PPO (Preferred Provider Organization) 
coverage. This search was performed on October 21, 2015.
We accessed the health plan’s database via the portal found 
at: http://provider.bcbs.com/. Once there, we selected 
the ‘Medicare Advantage PPO’ network and the ‘Ohio, 
Anthem Blue Cross and Blue Shield’ plan. We then specified 
‘cardiovascular disease’ for the specialty and ‘44106’ for the 
zip code. A total of 21 cardiovascular disease specialists were 
covered by ‘Ohio, Anthem Blue Cross and Blue Shield’ for the 
44106 zip code.
Search Strategy for Open Payments Program Data
We then mirrored the steps that a patient would take to 
determine whether doctors identified in the Health Plan 
Search were listed on the OPP database, again looking for 
cardiovascular disease specialists practicing in the randomly 
determined zip code of 44106. This search was performed on 
October 21, 2015. 
We accessed the OPP at: https://openpaymentsdata.cms.gov/
search, and entered ‘44106’ for the zip code and ‘Allopathic 
& Osteopathic Physicians/Internal Medicine, Cardiovascular 
Disease’ for specialty. We searched only for these two 
parameters. A list of 31 physicians’ names were retrieved for 
this specialty and zip code.
To find the total payments received in 2014, we went to each 
physician’s summary page in the OPP. In our study, ‘Total 
Payment Amount’ for each physician was aggregated from 
fields “Total General Payments,” “Total Research Payments,” 
and “Total Associated Research Funding.” We determined 
the median payment amount for physicians found exclusively 
in the OPP database. Separately, we determined the median 
payment amount for physicians found in both the OPP 
database and Blue Cross Blue Shield insurance portal. 
Physicians found in the Blue Cross Blue Shield portal but not 
the OPP database were assumed to have received no money 
($0.00) from third party companies in 2014.
Results 
Survey Results—Open Payments Program’s Potential
Which payments matter to patients? In our nationally 
representative survey of 1005 US residents age 18 and older, we 
found that while roughly one-third of respondents appeared 
to not care about transparency, even when—as described in 
our prompt—possible bias in physician prescribing can occur, 
knowing about benefits such as dinners at fine restaurants 
or paid lectures was important/very important to 63.5% of 
respondents (Table 1).
We looked at the association between each variable with the 
dichotomized importance variable and found there was no 
significant association. The association remained insignificant 
when we added all the variables to a logistic regression model 
at the same time (see Supplementary file 1).
Table 1. The Importance of Physician-Industry COI Disclosure 
According to US Residents
 Total (Percent)
 Total weighted 1000 (100.0)
 Completely unimportant/Not very important (Net) 359 (35.9)
 Completely unimportant 80 (8.0)
 Not very important 279 (27.9)
 Somewhat important/Very important (Net) 635 (63.5)
 Somewhat important 400 (40.0)
 Very important 234 (23.4)
 Refused 6 (0.6)
Abbriviation: COI, conflicts of interest.
US residents, 18 years and older, were informed that “Pharmaceutical and 
other health care manufacturing companies often promote their drugs and 
other products by inviting physicians to free dinners at fine restaurants. 
Companies also pay physicians for talks or lectures. Studies have shown 
that as a result, physicians can be more likely to prescribe the companies’ 
products.” Following this, they were asked, “In choosing a physician: how 
important is it to you to know whether your physician has received such 
benefits?” Scale was shown on a rotating alternating basis. The margin of 
error on weighted data is ±3 percentage points for the full sample.
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In principle, the OPP is therefore of considerable use—but we 
also found that only 7.9% were aware of it, and a mere 1.5% 
had ever accessed it (Table 2).
Open Payments Program and Blue Cross Blue Shield Data
Information in the OPP is not provided as helpfully as it could 
be. In a significant sense, the OPP is abstract and does not 
dovetail easily with the way patients go about finding a doctor 
when they need one. These searches are typically constrained 
by what choices physician networks and health care plans 
make available to patients; which physicians, among these, see 
patients in an appropriate time frame; and among these, which 
are within a reasonable distance. The following example, 
based on the searches described above, illustrates this. 
Suppose you are a Cleveland-based patient requiring a 
cardiovascular disease specialist. Your Blue Cross Blue Shield 
insurance portal identifies 21 doctors in your zip code (44106). 
You review their credentials on their professional websites, 
and search the same criteria within the OPP. The OPP shows 
the first physician received a total of $12 in 2014. The second, 
$110 472. You find another 29 physicians in this specialty 
and zip code, although eight physicians from your insurance 
website cannot be found in the OPP database, which you 
presume means that they did not accept industry payments. 
You calculate that the median annual payment for the Blue 
Cross Blue Shield identified physicians in this specialty and 
zip code is $379, and $9203 for only those listed in the OPP 
(Table 3). This puts the individual payments somewhat into 
perspective—even though you do not know how physicians 
compare to the city or state averages. And comparisons across 
particular payment subcategories (gifts, dining, speaker’s fees, 
etc) would require further manual searches.
Discussion 
Data listed in the OPP are organized suboptimally, and there 
is very low public awareness about the program. The result is 
transparency in obscurity, at best. A survey conducted in 2014 
independently from ours paints a similar picture, finding that 
12% of US citizens knew payment information was publically 
available, with 5% knowing whether their physicians received 
payments.47
Two simple policy improvements can substantially improve 
transparency, the validity of patients’ consent, and physicians’ 
reflection on COIs: meaningful contextualization of payment 
data and linking to physicians’ database entries directly from 
professional portals.
Improvements to Open Payments Program
Big data do not automatically translate into big benefits. 
But small tweaks can make big differences. For example, 
ProPublica’s Dollars for Docs database renders the OPP 
dataset to rank each physician by annual total payments 
within specialty in relation to state and national averages.48 
The denominator here ignores physicians without records and 
comparisons hence understate the significance of payments. 
But the approach nonetheless provides some context, 
and illustrates the technical feasibility of implementing 
comparative data output. In a similar vein, recently, the OPP 
was redesigned to provide national and specialty means. 
While these most recent revisions should be welcomed, they 
also need to go further and enable comparisons not just be 
provided nationally, but within states, and by city and zip code 
limits—the more typical boundaries for patients’ physician 
searches.
Dollar amounts alone could be meaningless to patients. But 
comparisons between all physicians a patient is considering, 
and with similar specialists in other locations can better 
orientate patients in selecting physicians. To be clear, high 
payments need not rule out physicians, but awareness can 
enable patients to raise the role of payments in the initial 
consultation to ensure care is not compromised.
Open Payments Program Access Improvements
Better organization of data are necessary, but not sufficient 
for meaningful OPP use. It is imperative to improve OPP 
access. Organizations such as the Patient-Centered Outcomes 
Research Institute (PCORI), or the US Preventive Services 
Task Force list conflict of interest information along with 
other biographical data.49,50 For context considered here, 
the most appropriate strategy would embed OPP data 
in patients’ typical searches by simply adding hyperlinks 
on physicians’ professional websites to their OPP entries. 
Physicians’ websites typically list qualifications, certifications, 
publications, and sometimes grants. COI data may be just as—
if not more—relevant to patients.42 Hospitals, health systems, 
and professional organizations usually specify website 
content categories. There is therefore considerable potential 
to demonstrate leadership in furthering patient-centered COI 
policy by providing patients with ready access to COI data by 
linking directly to the OPP. 
Improving Physicians’ Reflections on COI
Enhanced COI transparency may also change physicians’ 
behavior, as two analogies illustrate. Regarding electricity 
usage, high energy users who were made aware of their 
neighbors’ lower usage eventually decreased their own.51 
COI peer-comparisons could plausibly have similar effects. 
Physicians may not view their behavior as exceptional if 
immediate colleagues receive similar benefits. But if data 
clearly show their behavior as significant outliers at the zip 
Table 2. Whether US Residents Have Heard of or Used the CMS Open 
Payments Database
 Total (Percent)
 Total weighted 1000 (100.0)
 I have used the CMS Open Payment  database. 15 (1.5)
 I have heard of the CMS Open Payment  database 
but never used it.
79 (7.9)
 I have never heard of the CMS Open Payment 
Database.
896 (89.6)
 Refused 9 (0.9)
Abbreviation: CMS, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services.
US residents, 18 years and older, were asked, “How aware are you of the 
CMS Open Payments Database that can be searched on the internet by 
anyone to learn about financial relationships that particular physicians have 
with health care manufacturing companies?” Scale was shown on a rotating 
alternating basis. The margin of error on weighted data is ±3 percentage 
points for the full sample.
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Table 3. The Value of Comparative Data Output: Comparing Total Payment Amounts Received in 2014 by Cardiac Disease Specialists Who Practice Within 
the 44106 Zip Code
# Physician'sInitials
Is the Physician Listed on 
the Blue Cross Blue Shield 
Website?
Is the Physician Listed 
in the Open Payments 
Database?
Total Payment Amount for 
Physicians Listed in OPP
Total Payment Amount 
Modified to Include 
Physicians not Listed in OPP
1  M.A.* X    $0.00
2  A.P.* X    $0.00
3  N.R.* X    $0.00
4  D.S.* X    $0.00
5  J.S.* X    $0.00
6  R.W. X    $0.00
7  T.W.* X    $0.00
8  W.W. X    $0.00
9  S.H.  X  $11.81  $11.81
10  R.N.  X  $14.25  $14.25
11  D.S.  X  $46.03  $46.03
12  R.J. X X  $67.31  $67.31
13  L.G. X X  $136.61  $136.61
14  C.L. X X  $150.91  $150.91
15  T.J. X X  $209.15  $209.15
16  J.K.  X  $231.87  $231.87
17  A.H.  X  $271.59  $271.59
18  J.S. X X  $344.99  $344.99
19  C.A. X X  $358.24  $358.24
20  C.B. X  $379.36  $379.36
21  M.G. X X  $427.68  $427.68
22  M.F.  X  $585.39  $585.39
23  V.N. X  $1205.88  $1205.88
24  M.C. X X  $9203.45  $9203.45
25  G.A. X X  $11 460.03  $11 460.03
26  A.I. X  $11 852.27  $11 852.27
27  J.G. X  $14 225.07  $14 225.07
28  G.O. X X  $18 053.60  $18 053.60
29  T.L. X  $18 106.21  $18 106.21
30  F.S. X  $20 762.44  $20 762.44
31  D.S. X X  $25 904.02  $25 904.02
32  B.E. X  $37 359.23  $37 359.23
33  H.M. X X  $37 905.03  $37 905.03
34  B.H. X X  $62 987.91  $62 987.91
35  S.P.  X  $75 623.91  $75 623.91
36  J.O.  X  $83 804.46  $83 804.46
37  D.Z.  X  $88 827.86  $88 827.86
38  H.B.  X  $110 472.28  $110 472.28
39  M.C.  X  $447 507.92  $447 507.92
Median  $9203.45  $379.36
Abbreviation: OPP, Open Payments Program.
We searched for ‘cardiovascular disease’ specialists covered under the Medicare Advantage PPO’ insurance plan in the Blue Cross Blue Shield web portal who 
also practice within the 44106 zip code. This search yielded 21 physicians. We also searched for cardiovascular disease specialists in the OPP database who 
practice within the 44106 zip code. By the nature of this search, the 29 OPP-listed physicians received benefits from pharmaceutical or device companies in 
2014. Both searches were completed on October 21, 2015. Physicians with an asterisk (*) were listed in the OPP database under a different specialty.
code, city, or state level, the appropriateness of accepting 
benefits may be reconsidered.
The fact that comparisons are public can provide a further 
and independent incentive. For example, in advance of 
the Affordable Care Act’s requirement for large US chain 
restaurants to post calories, major companies reduced calories 
by around 12% for newly introduced items.52 The effect of 
what might be called the “benevolent pillory” recognizes 
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that perceptions of appropriate behavior can be as powerful 
as substantive agreement, and this can provide additional 
leverage in protecting patients from COIs.
Recent empirical work supports the plausibility of these 
arguments. In a series of six focus groups with 42 physicians, 
Chimonas and colleagues found that physicians have used the 
OPP database to reflect on their own payments and to check 
payments received by colleagues. Physicians welcomed the 
idea of transparency, but they had a broad unawareness of and 
lack of understanding about COIs.53
Limitations
For the example of a Cleveland-based patient requiring a 
cardiovascular disease specialist, we used the randomly 
selected zip code of 44106, a suburb of Cleveland, Ohio, 
which is also in close proximity to two large academic 
medical centers, University hospitals and the Cleveland 
Clinic. We also only looked at a single zip code, which is not 
likely representative of much of the United States. We took 
this approach to illustrate the basic problem, not to give a 
sense of how typical this spread is. We also did not collect 
qualitative data from actual patients on how easy or difficult 
it is to navigate the OPP online portal. Our aim was to show 
the type quantitative data that can be retrieved by patient 
searching for a particular physician and zip code.
We proposed that comparing providers within a geographic 
region is a worthwhile improvement to be made in presenting 
OPP data. It is important to appreciate that even if this is 
implemented, interpretation of these data can be confounded 
by other factors, for example, whether the providers are in 
academic versus private practice; the fact that certain types 
of payments, such as consulting,39 can be viewed as favorable; 
or that medians and means side-by-side can convey different 
messages. These and other related issues could be addressed 
either through more sophisticated data presentations or 
brief explanations—even if both impact the ease of use and 
intelligibility to lay users. Empirical testing can reveal which 
further tweaks are desirable, but overall, the perfect should 
not be the enemy of the good, and we maintain that significant 
progress can be made by implementing the proposals we 
suggest here.
Conclusion
COIs risk undercutting the principle of informed consent with 
the potential to harm patients physically, psychologically, and 
financially. COIs can also needlessly increase healthcare cost. 
Truly patient-centerd COI policy requires contextualized 
data visualizations and modes of access that align naturally 
with the way patients search for physicians. While there 
is still much work to be done with collecting payment data 
and deciding as a society how to react to them, our two 
suggestions—providing data for individual physicians in 
relation to zip code, city, and state averages, and creating 
hyperlinks from physicians’ professional websites directly to 
their Open Payments disclosure pages—are simple in their 
implementation, and could go a long way in helping patients 
and the medical community as a whole. While knowing if a 
COI exists by itself alone will not make the difference between 
informed and uninformed consent, it seems hard to see on 
what grounds it should be acceptable to deny patients the 
opportunity to integrate data on possible conflicts in their 
decision-making—especially since these have been made 
available in principle.
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